Democracy and Homeland Security: Strategies, Controversies, and Impact

Part I. Papers Presented in Panels 1–4

Public Speech, Public Reason, and Public Policy in a Pluralistic Society

James F. Harris, College of William and Mary

Since the terrorist attacks upon the United States on September 11, 2001 (commonly referred to as 9/11), there has been a significant increase of emphasis on homeland security. Congress created the new, cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security and passed the controversial USA PATRIOT Act, which gives unprecedented powers to various law enforcement agencies. A growing controversy has resulted from this increased emphasis on homeland security and the possible conflicts that have arisen between the USA PATRIOT Act and constitutionally guaranteed individual rights. Given what many people perceive to be a major shift in the resulting balance of power between individual autonomy and constitutionally guaranteed rights on the one hand and governmental authority on the other, it is more important than ever to focus attention upon the political arena in which public policy and legislation that are restrictive or coercive of citizens are proposed, debated, and ultimately formulated or enacted. In particular, given that the attacks of 9/11 were reportedly motivated by a holy jihad against the United States by radical Muslims, it is crucial to reexamine the relationship between religious belief and political action and claims regarding religious freedom in a liberal democracy.

I maintain that public policy in a liberal democracy must be the result of only public speech and public reason. In support of this claim, I focus on developing the theoretical grounding for the kind of public speech and public reason to which a person or group might appeal legitimately within a liberal, pluralistic democracy to suggest, promote, oppose, or otherwise influence the process for the possible adoption of such restrictive or coercive public policies or legislation. The main problem becomes one of providing a theoretical account for legitimate ways of preserving the security and stability of a well-ordered society in the face of a pluralism that results from a diversity of fundamental human beliefs that occurs in a society in which citizens are divided by incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral beliefs.

I begin with some preliminary remarks concerning what I mean by a liberal democracy. Nowadays, the phrase political liberalism means different things to different people. An intense controversy swirls around the notion of liberalism that has served to frame what has become the default political division in the United States between liberals and conservatives. I intend to avoid this controversy and sidestep this debate. In my use of the notion of a liberal democracy, the qualifier liberal simply means that human freedom is a good thing and ceteris paribus means more human freedom is better than less. To this extent, such a claim is obviously normative, but I hope to provide a grounding for this normative aspect of liberal democratic theory. The issues that I want to address have nothing to do with what has, more recently, been called welfare liberalism or reform liberalism. In its classic stage that grew out of the Enlightenment, liberal democratic theory advocated a minimalist view of government and a minimalist view of the need for governmental or ecclesiastical controls, restrictions, or regulations on human political, social, and economic affairs.

More fundamentally and more importantly, however, such claims about the limitations of governmental authority and the value of individual freedom and autonomy were based upon a specific philosophical view of human nature. Amongst the major Enlightenment figures, the view of human nature espoused by Immanuel Kant is perhaps most illustrative. At the time of the Enlightenment, theological views that regarded human nature as basically corrupt and sinful also regarded human beings as incapable of properly regulating their own affairs without divine assistance—given either through the Roman Catholic Church or its chosen commissioners. In contrast, Kant explained that the Enlightenment movement was based upon a view of man as a mature creature who has the will and the courage to use his understanding without the need of assistance. As rational creatures, human beings qua human beings are unique in having the capacity to regulate their own social, economic, and political affairs, make their own laws, and construct their own governments without the need of assistance from some other source—divine or ecclesiastical. Kant’s view of human nature provides a theoretical account according to which human beings come to be regarded as the source of legitimate political authority and human freedom comes to be valued. Given this view of human nature, it is easy to understand Kant’s claim that “Nothing is required for this enlightenment [sic] . . . except freedom.” The freedom that is so important, according to Kant, is nothing more than “the freedom to use reason publicly in all matters.”1 Whereas the military officer says, “Do not argue, just obey,” and the religious pastor says, “Do not argue, just believe,” the Enlightenment figure says, “Use your reason to argue publicly all you want and the more the better.”2 Thus, although a person’s use of reason might be restricted in certain private venues, it is the free, public use of one’s reason, unrestricted and unregulated, upon which liberal democratic theory is founded.

Jefferson enthusiastically embraced the Enlightenment’s view of human nature, which for Jefferson meant that human beings are ceteris paribus their own best authorities regarding their social and political ends and their values and goals.3 Therefore, the less government interferes with individuals the better, and the more freedom that individuals have the better. Given this view of human beings, one of the most important things that a democratic government can provide for its citizens is a proper education, and given that human beings are profoundly educable, progress in social and political affairs is directly correlated with progress in the development of scientific knowledge and secular education.4

Such a view is far removed from the theological view of human nature based upon the doctrine of original sin that pervaded Western Europe before the Enlightenment. Human beings are no longer viewed as fundamentally evil or hapless creatures incapable of regulating their political and economic affairs without divine or ecclesiastical intervention. Admittedly, Jefferson, as well as the other major Enlightenment figures, might have been a bit too optimistic in their estimation of the power of knowledge and education upon human nature. That issue must, however, be left for debate on another occasion. The important point for present purposes is to note the affinity that Jefferson insisted upon between the use of human reason and the faculty of the understanding and the proper structuring of a democratic society that maximizes human freedom and nurtures human flourishing.

Nowhere is Jefferson’s position on the importance of the exercise of human reason in the public arena and the protection of public speech and public reason more evident than in his insistence that religion be kept out of the affairs of the state. This is a hard lesson that is arguably in need of repeating for current times. Just a bit of history is in order to set the stage for the discussion of the relationship between religion and the state. When most people today in the United States think of the notion of “the separation of church and state,” they probably think of the First Amendment of the Constitution. However, perhaps to the surprise of many, the First Amendment makes no mention of “the separation of church and state.” What the First Amendment does say is that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Originally, then, the First Amendment presumably gave free rein to religions while restricting the actions of Congress. In his 1802 letter of reply to the Danbury Baptist Association of Connecticut, President Jefferson established a “wall of separation between Church & State.” While I make no claim to being a constitutional scholar, “a wall of separation” between church and state clearly prohibits not just the imposition of state authority in the practice of religion or the imposition by the state of a state-supported religion but also the interaction between church and state. The doctrine of the separation between religion and the state not only prohibits the meddling by the state in the affairs of religion; it also prohibits the meddling by religion in the affairs of the state.

This doctrine of the separation of the public affairs of state and the private affairs of religion was first expressed publicly by Jefferson in The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, which he authored in 1777.5 In the poignant preamble to this statute, Jefferson not only rails against the possibility of a state-imposed tax to support a church—which was perhaps the most politically volatile issue of the day—but he also insists, more generally, that “our civil rights have no dependence on our religious opinions, any more than our opinions in physics or geometry.” The Jeffersonian doctrine of the separation of civil affairs from religious beliefs undercuts the claims by some religious leaders that our politics must be informed by our religion. Ignoring the more practical issue of the conflicts that arise in a pluralistic society in which the citizens are deeply and irrevocably divided about their religious beliefs, the commingling of religion with politics threatens the very foundation upon which liberal democratic theory is based.

What this brief excursion into the philosophical framework and political history of the constitutional democracy of the United States reveals is that there is an early and persistent division between the public affairs of the state and the private affairs of the individual citizens of the state. The clearest and sharpest such division is drawn by the Jeffersonian principle of the separation of state and church. There are important lessons to be learned from this brief bit of history concerning the basic philosophical principles that frame the general theoretical context within which public policy and legislation are debated and formulated. Following in the Jeffersonian tradition, we must adopt what I call the “Principle of Exclusion” that imposes a minimal prima facie obligation upon the participants in public debates concerning the possible adoption of coercive or restrictive public policy to refrain from appealing to private beliefs in their public speech and debate.6 In other words, in a pluralistic democracy, public policy must flow only from public speech and public reason. Some might object that the Principle of Exclusion amounts to a limitation on constitutionally guaranteed rights, such as free speech, but I maintain that some such restriction upon unlimited free speech is necessary to guarantee free speech itself. Furthermore, I maintain that some form of the Principle of Exclusion is already operative in the United States on some levels and in some situations.

Currently in the United States, situations that pit public reason against privately held beliefs are finding the spotlight, and these situations should serve to focus attention upon the issue of determining what kinds of considerations are appropriate considering the theoretical framework within which laws and public policy are debated and determined. Seventh-Day Adventists believe that allowing certain medical procedures (including surgery) or taking medications amounts to an invasion of the body by evil spirits and is an abomination to God and threatens the afterlife of the spiritual soul. On these grounds, medical treatment is often refused—even for minor children. Similarly, consider the practice by some Muslims said to be demanded by Shari’a. So, there are cases of denying or coercing medical treatments or medications on unwilling citizens on the bases of religious beliefs—one practiced by some Christians and one by some Muslims. Can one allow even the consideration of private religious reasons in a public forum for determining laws or public policy concerning the denial or coercion of medical procedures in a liberal democracy? I maintain that one cannot. Now there might certainly be good public reasons for denying or coercing medical treatments or procedures on unwilling citizens. The unwilling citizens—including minor children—might be forced into quarantine or to have inoculations to prevent the spread of some highly contagious disease that threatens the public health. Many public water systems include fluoride treatment as a routine matter of course. The public reasons for adopting such public policies lend themselves to analysis, careful consideration, and deliberation and appeal to the rational part of human nature, whereas the religious reasons that spring exclusively from some religious authority or tradition do not lend themselves to the same sort of careful examination and critical analysis by human reason. The Jeffersonian principle of the separation of the public state and private religion means that people are entitled to their private religious beliefs without fear of state intervention. In fact, the principle of separation guarantees and protects those beliefs from state intervention. At the same time, however, those private religious beliefs cannot be introduced into the arena of public debate about public policy and the allocation of services and practices.

While there is no formal principle of exclusion or legal requirement prohibiting a person from introducing private beliefs into public debate in the public arena, there are obvious situations where the inappropriateness of relying upon such beliefs is clearly recognized. Consider the procedure used in the process of jury selection in state courts in the United States for capital murder cases in those states that use the death penalty. Prospective jurors who object to the death penalty on religious grounds are automatically excluded from jury duty in such cases. Now what might be the underlying philosophical explanation for this procedure? The answer seems to be that what we have in this situation is nothing more than an implicit recognition of the Principle of Exclusion. Here a citizen is in the most public of places that an ordinary citizen is ever likely to be—in the courts of the land—doing the business of the state, acting as a citizen qua citizen. It is in this public arena that one must put aside private beliefs and act as a public figure appealing only to that speech and that reason that is public. In this situation, the citizen is being denied nothing to be told that he or she must put private religious beliefs aside. One is still free to practice one’s religion and to believe what one will without fear of state intervention or restriction, but one cannot attempt to impose those private beliefs upon the state when acting qua citizen. One can have whatever private religious beliefs one might; however, one cannot bring them to the public table.

Another example involves the present hotly debated issue of gay marriage in the United States. President Bush has indicated his support for a constitutional amendment limiting legal marriage to one man and one woman; however, such an amendment was actually introduced some time ago by Marilyn Musgrave, a congresswoman from Colorado. Musgrave is now suddenly in the media spotlight, and to her credit (and regardless of whether one might support or oppose such an amendment), she has refused (to this point at least) to reveal or introduce her personal reasons for supporting the bill. The matter, she has insisted, is one of public interest, and thus only those considerations having to do with the social stability of the country, such as the protection of the family, the welfare of children, the impact on existing laws and policies, and economic considerations involving existing programs, such as social security, should be introduced into the debate. Arguments concerning these different considerations might go in different directions for different people, but these are all considerations that are open to public debate, analysis, and argument. One might be persuaded by reason to agree or disagree with any of these highly relevant factors; however, evidently Musgrave recognizes that the debate cannot even take place if people introduce their own private, religious beliefs into the public arena. We can see clearly, in this example, the trailing legacy of Kant’s and Jefferson’s views of human beings as rational creatures who are educable, and it is to this part of human nature to which one must appeal in the public debate involving important possible changes in laws and public policy.

One must appeal to some form of the Principle of Exclusion in a liberal democracy to preserve and guarantee the safety and security of a well-ordered society. It is time to look at the alternative to the Principle of Exclusion and the reasons why some people oppose it. Some scholars defend what I call the Principle of Inclusion, the view that in the public forum each citizen ought to be permitted, with no restrictions or limitations whatsoever, to appeal to whatever reasons and speech that person might prefer. This is a “no holds barred,” “the more the merrier,” “the sky’s the limit,” “let the chips fall where they may” approach to the question of how to structure the public forum for public debate.7 Now, initially, this principle certainly seems to have a democratic ring to it—giving each person his or her opportunity to say what he or she wants on whatever grounds or reasons he or she holds most dear (including religious ones). It also has a certain appeal to those who worry about any limitations on free speech or freedom of religion. The Principle of Inclusion appears to get everyone to the public table for political discourse on an equal footing with a level playing field so the democratic process can then proceed in a manner to guarantee that the outcome is “really” democratic.

Suppose, however, a devout believer insists that he or she must be true to his or her religious beliefs and that his or her public actions and speech must be informed by his or her religious views. Those who feel this way might insist that this is a “Christian nation” and that the forefathers of this country (except perhaps Jefferson) saw themselves as acting upon religiously motivated views. What is wrong with this view? The most significant reason why the Principle of Inclusion cannot work in a pluralistic liberal democracy with religious diversity to grant blanket approval for people to act publicly on their private religious views is because for this principle to be operative in a continuing, stable society, one must assume the Principle of Exclusion is in place. This is a fundamental, theoretical point that will likely not be appreciated by those in the United States who are a part of the religious hegemony. So long as the public expression of one’s religious views is endorsed by the religious hegemony, things will go smoothly; however, there is no theoretical guarantee that the hegemony will allow all religious views to be expressed. The excessive inclusiveness of the Principle of Inclusion cannot prevent limitations that might be imposed by a religious hegemony that, as a part of its claim to exclusivity, denies other religions free expression in the public arena.

Allowing appeals to private, religious beliefs provides no theoretical prohibition against a religious oligarchy or a situation in which the differences become so polarized and intractable that there is no peaceful solution—creating what Audi has called a “Clash of Gods,” a “battle to the death.”8 A “clash of Gods” represents a conflict in which differing parties appeal to religious principles or beliefs that are maintained on the sole basis of religious authority or tradition and which do not lend themselves to resolution or even critical examination by reason. Such a conflict results in a highly emotionally charged, intractable, recalcitrant posture in which only violence appears to be a possible course of action. There is no theoretical difference between an abortion opponent who murders or bombs abortion clinics on the basis of religious belief and “terrorists” who fly airplanes into buildings on the basis of religious belief. Both are enemies of a well-ordered, pluralistic liberal democracy, and the only difference is the scope of the attacks. There is an important reason why public policy is called public policy.

The everyday consequences for a liberal democracy, which maximizes individual freedom, are evidenced on a regular basis—both in the United States and in what I will call “developing democracies.” Consider the celebrated case of the judge in Alabama who was censured for refusing to remove a display containing the Ten Commandments. He maintained that the display was appropriate because he believed that it was his devout religious duty to insist that the proceedings of the court be informed by these religious principles. The higher courts, in their wisdom, upheld the Jeffersonian principle of the separation of religion and state. Those who insist upon the explicit incorporation of their own religious principles or beliefs in the public forum suffer from religious myopia. In a pluralistic society, there is an obvious goose and gander issue that cannot be ignored. What if Muslims insisted on displaying verses from the Qur’an? And what if others wanted to include sayings of Confucius? Or Buddhists, directions concerning the Eight Fold Path? The resulting unresolvable tangled mess is obvious. Or, consider the present controversy about the inclusion of the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance to the American flag. What if a different religious hegemony decides to include the phrase “under the one and only Allah” instead? Or yet a different religious majority insists “under Yahweh” instead? Or yet another religious group suggests “under Vishnu” instead? Contrary to the position urged by some religious leaders, protecting religious freedom in a liberal democracy means denying religious expression in the official business of the courts of the land. A pluralistic and liberal democratic society can be one nation only under no god.

The degree of separation of religion and state provides a significant point of comparison amongst existing and developing democracies as well as perhaps the most valuable lesson for addressing problems created by the changing political landscape in the world today. If a liberal democracy is to flourish in a pluralistic society, then the secular public forum in which laws and public policy are instituted must be separated and insulated from private religious influence. Consider the case of Israel, in which there is no pretext of the separation of religion and state so far as marriage laws are concerned. The only marriage ceremony recognized by the state is the Orthodox Jewish ceremony; no civil ceremony for marriage is allowed. Interreligious marriages are not recognized by the state, and other laws prohibit Jews and Palestinians who marry from living together in Israel. So, whatever else the state of Israel might be, it is not and cannot be a liberal democracy and is not and cannot become a pluralistic society while such restrictions remain in place. In fact, such laws seem obviously intended to stifle both freedom and diversity and, of course, this is likely the intended purpose of such laws.

Compare the situation in France, a secular democracy and a pluralistic society, facing a growing population of Muslims. Currently, France is considering a ban on Islamic headscarves, Jewish skullcaps, and other conspicuous religious symbols being worn by children in public (state-supported) schools. Why is this such a big deal in France? One only has to think of the history of France and its domination by the Roman Catholic Church to realize the sensitivity of the issue. In the not-too-distant past, religion controlled the state in France. While this is a more complicated case, the public display of religious symbols can have the force of religious speech and be interpreted as expressing religious views. If those views are associated with what are taken to be violent or civilly disruptive groups, then some regulation or prohibition might be in order to preserve the security and stability of a pluralistic society. Something of this same situation has arisen involving the burning of crosses or the display of the Confederate flag in the United States and the display of a swastika in Germany.

The reforms that have taken place in Iran over the past several years are perceived by many to be progressive and as an encouraging sign for the spread of democracy in conservative Muslim countries. After all, Shirin Ebadi was named the winner of the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize (the first Muslim woman to be so honored) for her efforts at securing basic human rights for women and children in Iran, and there is no doubt that she has had an enormously positive influence in a hitherto repressive society. However, in terms of the underlying political framework within which the changes have taken place, the picture is not so rosy. Ebadi won her victories by arguing with the religious clerics in power for a more liberal interpretation of Muslim law and the Qur’an. In terms of the political theory involved, one might see the effort as one of attempting to make Islam more democratic. Although there are undeniably important and immediate pragmatic consequences of this approach, in terms of the big picture and the long run, this approach cannot be a successful recipe for providing a basis for a liberal democracy. Such an approach simply sets the stage for continued, intractable conflicts. The result is simply a more tolerant and more liberal theocracy. A liberal democracy cannot be Islamic; nor can a liberal democracy be Christian or Jewish. A society that is not religiously pluralistic cannot be liberally democratic without providing the political framework within which it might someday evolve into a religiously pluralistic society.

The only theoretical framework that can provide maximum freedom for citizens and preserve the security, stability, and peaceful functioning of a well-ordered society in the face of pluralism is a strict separation of religion and state resulting from the use of some form of the Principle of Exclusion. It is no simple accident of history that the great political revolutions of the eighteenth century that introduced democracy into the modern world had to follow the scientific revolution. Galileo had to fight and win his battle with the Roman Catholic Church, defending the use of the scientific method over religious authority to investigate and provide knowledge of the natural world before Jefferson could establish his wall of separation between church and state. The advent of science provided a reliable method of inquiry, theoretically available to the common person qua human being, that contains the implicit recognition of human nature as capable of doing the inquiring, acquiring the evidence, making the inferences, and developing the theories without the necessity of divine guidance. It is then a short step to regarding human beings as capable of determining their own social and political ends and their values and goals.

These points should illuminate the dangers of the Principle of Inclusion. When U.S. Army Lt. Gen. William G. Boykin characterized the war on terrorism as a battle of God against Satan, he resorted to describing the struggle on the same religious grounds as the terrorists themselves. Boykin was quoted in the media as describing a battle against a Muslim leader in Somalia in 1993 by saying, “I knew that my God was bigger than his. I knew that my God was a real God, and his was an idiot.” What better illustration could one have of Audi’s “Clash of Gods”? My god can beat up your god! But democracy can be no more Buddhist, Hindu, Christian, Jewish, or Muslim than can science. The long-term stability and security of a liberal democracy in a pluralistic society requires a political suspension of the religious, and the great political struggle in the world today is not a struggle between Christianity and Islam; it is a struggle between secular democracy and religion.

To turn briefly to the matter of homeland security, one can expect that some of the situations involving a conflict between private beliefs and public policy will be directly related to homeland security, and one should expect more and more such conflicts in the future. Recently, for example, in the state of Florida, a Muslim woman challenged the legality of the state law requiring a full-facial photograph for a person holding a license to operate a motor vehicle. She complained that requiring the photograph violated her right to freedom of religion because, at least according to her interpretation, Islamic Shari’a required her to wear a burqa veil so as not to show her face to men other than her husband. The courts denied her claim on the grounds that the public interest outweighed her private interest; however, and more poignantly, this case serves to illustrate the double-edged nature of the principle of the separation of church and state that leads to the Principle of Exclusion. There might be legitimate considerations that a citizen might raise about various state laws concerning the operation of motor vehicles, but allowing the introduction of private religious beliefs into the equation invites chaos. In a pluralistic society, such as the United States, where citizens are divided by fundamentally incompatible religious beliefs, one cannot provide for a well-ordered society and preserve the security and stability of that society by allowing private religious beliefs to determine or influence laws or public policy. Requiring this woman to have her photograph taken to operate a motor vehicle is not a violation of her right to religious freedom. Operating a motor vehicle on a public street or highway is a privilege granted and protected by the state and, in a society in which such a privilege is granted, the state must take appropriate measures to ensure that the exercise of the privilege is conducted in an orderly manner that preserves the safety and security of the society. Exactly what those appropriate measures are is a matter that must be determined in a public forum and on grounds that are open to public debate.

Presently in Iraq, there is a test-tube case study of a developing democracy. How will this experiment go? As Iraq’s Governing Council debates the issues and attempts to draft an interim constitution and as the future, to-be-elected Parliament tackles drafting a permanent constitution, a major area of dispute concerns how much influence Islam will have in the constitution and government. There is no more important issue in determining whether a constitutional liberal democracy emerges that is stable and permanent. Shiite and Sunni representatives have their own interpretations of the Qur’an and Islamic Shari’a. At stake are the constitutionally guaranteed rights for the Kurdish minority and for women. Although it must be the topic for another occasion and although comparing political situations across epochs is always dangerous, the parallel between the current political situation in Iraq and the situation in which Jefferson established his wall of separation between church and state is striking. Jefferson similarly faced the passionate opposition from several different religious groups—from the Anglicans to the Baptists. If one can imagine the political situation in the United States in 1802 as being charged with the same explosive volatility as the current situation in Iraq, then one can begin to appreciate the enormous significance of Jefferson’s stance. To paraphrase Jefferson in what is now a politically correct manner, “Religion is a private matter between a person and his or her god and must be separated from the public affairs of state.” A democratic state must be protected from religious zealots of all stripes. This is one of the most crucial and theoretically fundamental principles for preserving and protecting a stable, well-ordered liberal democracy.


1. Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?” in Readings on Human Nature, ed. Peter Loptson (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview, 1998), 122. Not all liberals share this view of human nature. For example, for comparative views and a discussion of the view of John Rawls, see Richard Rorty, “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy,” in The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, ed. Merrill Peterson and Robert Vaughan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 257–82.

2. Kant, “An Answer to the Question,” 122. This is a paraphrase of Kant.

3. This view of Jefferson’s might be seen as representing the Enlightenment’s optimistic embodiment of Plato’s claim that to know the good is to do the good.

4. This theoretical separation of religion and the state is quite consistent with the fact that many of the founding fathers of the United States were personally motivated by religious belief.

5. Although drafted in 1777, the General Assembly of Virginia did not adopt this statute until 1786.

6. I argued the importance of the Principle of Exclusion in “On the Proper Roles of Secular Reason and Religious Reason in a Liberal Democracy,” in Philosophy of Religion in a New Century, ed. Jerald Wallulis and Jeremiah Hackett  (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 2004), 335ff.

7. For example, see Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Why We Should Reject What Liberalism Tells Us about Speaking and Acting in Public for Religious Reasons,” in Religion and Contemporary Liberalism, ed. Paul J. Weithman (Notre Dame, Ind,: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 175ff. I have criticized Wolterstorff’s claim in detail in “On the Proper Role of Secular Reason and Religious Reason in a Liberal Democracy,” in Religion and Contemporary Liberalism, ed. Paul J. Weithman (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 336ff.

8. Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 174.